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Abstract
This paper is an analysis of a two-sided search model in which agents are vertically
heterogeneous and some agents do not know their own types. Agents who do not know
their own types update their beliefs about their own types through the o¤ers or rejections
that they receive from others. In the belief-updating process, an agent who is unsure of her
own type frequently rejects (accepts) a man whom she accepts (rejects) when she knows
her own type. In this paper, we show that this optimistic (pessimistic) behavior inuences
both the agents and other agentsmatching behaviors. We show, specically, that the
optimism of some agents prevents the lowest-type agents from matching. However, the
pessimism of some agents does not a¤ect the matching of the lowest-type agents.
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1 Introduction
The looking-glass self has been the dominant concept in sociology and social psychology
for the development of the self. The idea, attributed to Cooley (1902), is that people form
their self-views by observing how others treat them. That is, others are signicant as the
mirrorsthat reect images of the self. Although there is much literature on the looking-
glass selfin the eld of sociology and social psychology, the topic has received little attention
in economics.1
In this paper, we introduce the looking-glass selfto a two-sided search model and study
the implications of the looking-glass self in the search behavior. We construct a model
in which searchers do not know their own types, although they know the types of others.
They then update their beliefs about their own types when they receive o¤ers or rejections
from others. For example, workers in search of an employer are evaluated by employers
on their abilities when they meet. When a worker is young in terms of experience, his or
her self-assessment is based on limited experience. On the other hand, employers may have
considerable experience in evaluating workers. At this time, when a young worker observes
an o¤er or a rejection from an employer, he or she learns something about his or her own
type. Of course, when an experienced worker searches for a new job that is very similar to
his or her previous job, he or she may have a more accurate self-view of his or her ability
than employers. However, such situations are not considered in this paper. The key feature
of this study is that others have better information about agents types than the agents
themselves. Similarly, in the search for a marriage partner, a single agent is evaluated with
regard to his or her marital charms by a member of the opposite sex when they meet. When
an agent is young, his or her self-assessment is based on limited experience, such as academic
achievement and family background. However, because marital charm is composed of various
elements, an individual of the opposite sex may have better assessments of the agentscharm
than the agents themselves.2 Hence, when an agent observes an o¤er or a rejection from a
member of the opposite sex, he or she infers something about his or her own type. In this
paper, we show that this looking-glass self inuences both their own and other agentssearch
behaviors.
We consider the basic framework of Burdett and Coles (1997), which is a two-sided search
model with complete information. Although our model focuses on marriage, one could apply
the ideas and techniques of the present paper to other two-sided search frameworks, such as
the labor market, the housing market, and other markets in which heterogeneous buyers and
sellers search for the right trading partner.3 Using the marriage market interpretation, the
1As we discuss below, in economics, Bénabou and Tirole (2003), Ishida (2006), and Swank and Visser
(2006) consider the looking-glass self in principal-agent models.
2Marital charm is dened by various elements, including quality, attraction, intelligence, height, age, ed-
ucation, income, position at work, social status, and family background, in much of the literature regarding
marriage.
3 In this paper, we assume the non-transferable utility: there is no bargaining for the division of the total
utility. In the labor market, utility is generally transferable. However, for example, when the worker is
enthusiastic about a job because of its location, or the employer is attracted by the worker because of his or
her personality, their utilities can be considered to be not-transferable. Furthermore if the worker o¤ers to
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model is described as follows. Single agents are vertically heterogeneous, i.e., there exists
a ranking of marital charm (types). Single men or women enter the market in order to
look for a marital partner. When a man and a woman meet, an opponents type can be
recognized. The agents optimal search strategy has the reservation-level property, i.e., he or
she continues searching until he or she meets a member of the opposite sex who is at least
as good as the predetermined threshold, called the reservation level,which depends on the
agents search cost and the type distribution of agents. If a man and a woman meet and
both agents propose, they marry and leave the market. If at least one of the two decides not
to propose, they separate and continue to search for another partner. Given these settings,
the marriage pattern (i.e., who marries whom) in the market is determined. This marriage
pattern becomes a kind of positive assortative matching.4
Our results are as follows. When an agent (she) is unsure of her own type, she often
rejects (accepts) a man whom she accepts (rejects) when she knows her own type. We call
her behavior optimism (pessimism) in this study.5 The optimism in an agents learning
processes generates two (pecuniary) externalities. The rst is direct externality : the rejection
from an optimistic woman delays the timing of marriage of the man who is directly rejected
by her when they meet. If there are many optimistic women in the market, the second
externality is generated: the men who are now rejected by the optimistic women accept
another lower type of women who are rejected by these men when all agents know their own
types. We call this change in an agents behavior due to the optimism of other agents indirect
externality. Moreover, in a two-sided search framework, the women who are now accepted
by these men also reject the men whom they accept when all agents know their own types.
Then, the indirect externality spreads across the market. As a result, the lowest-type agents
cannot marry.
On the other hand, the pessimism does not generate the indirect externality. This is
because if the indirect externality of pessimism occurs (in other words, if the men who are
now accepted by pessimistic women reject the women whom these men accept when all
agents know their own types), the o¤ers from these men to the pessimistic women inform
these pessimistic women that they are higher-type women than they think. As a result, the
pessimistic women have the incentives to reject these men. Hence, even if there are many
pessimistic women, the men who are now accepted by these women always accept the women
whom they accept when all agents know their own types. Therefore, the pessimism has only
the direct externality : the acceptance by a pessimistic woman makes the future partner better
o¤ because she increases the value of the match to the partner.
work for a reduced wage, this wage might be restricted to be above some lower bound determined outside of
the match, like a legislated minimum wage or an industry-wide union relationship (see Burdett and Wright
(1998)). In this way, when wages and all other terms of the relationship are xed in advance and there is
nothing for the pair to negotiate after they meet, their utilities can be viewed as not-transferable utility.
4Positive assortative matching is said to hold if the characteristics (types and marital charm) of those
who match are positively correlated. Becker (1973) found strong empirical evidence of a positive correlation
between the characteristics of partners.
5The optimistic (pessimistic) behavior in this paper is generated due to the correct belief-updating process
in the sense that there is no over-optimism, because an agent who is unsure of her own type knows the
ditributions of types in the market and updates her belief by Bayes rule.
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The result in which the lowest-type agents cannot marry in an optimism case is consistent
with the recent data of educational assortative marriage patterns in the United States and
Japan. In the United States and Japan, the percentage of never-married men or women
is increasing and, in particular, the percentage of never-married men or women with a low
level of education is notably high. According to the US Census Bureau data, in 2006, the
proportion of never-married individuals aged 3544 was 24% for men with a high school
education or less and 14% for women with a high school education or less. On the other
hand, the proportion of never married individuals aged 3544 was 14% for men with some
college education or more and 12% for women with some college education or more. In
Japan, the decline in marriage has been most pronounced among less educated men aged
3539 (Raymo and Iwasawa 2005). Our results suggest that the optimism accelerates the
increase in the proportion of never-married men or women with a low level of education, as
education is one of the elements of charm.
Our model can also explain the fact that the reservation level declines with the duration of
search. The potential sources of declining reservation wages have received much attention in
the labor market (see, Burdett and Vishwanath (1988)). Burdett and Vishwanath show that
when workers learn the unknown wage distribution, the reservation wage of an unemployed
worker declines with his or her unemployment spell. A high o¤er results in the worker getting
employed. On the other hand, an o¤er much lower than expected leads the worker to perceive
the jobs available to him or her as jobs o¤ering low wages and then the worker revises his
or her reservation wage downward. Unlike their model, ours is a two-sided search and single
agents know the type distribution but do not know their own types. In the two-sided search
with imperfect self-knowledge, receiving an o¤er lower than the reservation level is likely to
lead to an increase in the reservation level. The results in this paper show that if a woman
with imperfect self-knowledge starts to search with the strategy of accepting only the highest-
type man, she revises her reservation level downward whenever the woman receives a rejection
that has some information about her own type. On the other hand, a high o¤er results in the
agent getting married similarly to the nding by Burdett and Vishwanath. However, an o¤er
lower than the reservation level of a woman with imperfect self-knowledge does not a¤ect
her decision. An o¤er much lower than the reservation level is proposed by a man whom
the woman with imperfect self-knowledge rejects. Thus, her decision regarding whether to
accept or not another type of man is not a¤ected by that o¤er. An o¤er from a man whom
she decides whether to accept or not also does not a¤ect her decision in equilibrium because
the man chooses his strategy so as not to raise her reservation level.
The results in this study also show that, when there are agents with an imperfect self-
knowledge under the cloning assumption and the assumption of non-transferable utility, mul-
tiple equilibria can arise in some parameter ranges. In contrast, when all agents know their
own types under the cloning assumption and the assumption of non-transferable utility, a
unique equilibrium always arises (see Burdett and Coles (1997)). In our multiple equilibrium
case, marriage patterns are determined by all agents expectations about the behaviors of
agents with imperfect self-knowledge.
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1.1 Related literature
Early psychologists and sociologists thought that the self was built on reected assessments
people form their self-views by observing how others treat them. James (1890), who set the
stage for the idea of looking-glass self, argued that the self was a product and reection
of social life. Cooley (1902) introduced the idea of the looking-glass self. He expanded
the idea that the self develops by referencing other people in the social environment. Cooley
maintained that the person observes how others view himself or herself and then incorporates
those views into the self-view. Mead (1934) further developed the idea of Cooley (1902).6
Following this long tradition, most researchers in psychology and sociology accepted that
others are signicant as the mirrorsthat construct and modify the self-view (see Tice and
Wallace (2003)).
In economics, recent work has introduced the idea of looking-glass self (for example,
Bénabou and Tirole (2003), Ishida (2006), and Swank and Visser (2006)). Bénabou and Tirole
(2003), who present the principal-agent model, assume that, whereas the principal knows the
agents type, an agent has imperfect knowledge about his or her own type. Because the
principal prefers to o¤er the challenging task when facing an agent with high ability, this
o¤er becomes the signal that the principal trusts the agent. In contrast with these studies,
we apply the idea of the looking-glass self to the two-sided search model and not to the
principal-agent model.
In search literature, there are few studies that have given attention to the imperfect
self-knowledge. In Gonzalez and Shi (2010), agents learn their own job-nding abilities by
observing o¤ers or rejections from rms. In the directed search model with two types of
agents, they show that learning from search can induce the desired wages (the wage in the
chosen submarket) and reservation wages to decline with unemployment duration. In par-
ticular, the value function of an unemployed worker strictly increases in the workers belief
in their model because a workers (or a rms) search decision is to choose the submarket
to search. Hence, the reservation wage strictly decreases over search spell as the workers
beliefs about his or her own ability become progressively worse. In contrast, our model
is the random two-side search model with three types of agents. An agent with imperfect
self-knowledge decides the reservation utility by considering the composition of each (belief)
type in the market and her future learning process fully. As a result, the value function is
not monotonic with respect to agents belief: there is a case in which even if an agent with
imperfect self-knowledge receives an o¤er that has some information about her own type, her
belief is updated but her reservation level does not increase.7
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a description of the basic framework for
6 In his view, people are a¤ected not only by how they think signicant others respond to them but also by
how they think their entire social group does.
7 In other search literature with Bayesian leaning, agents do not know the types of opponents and then they
learn them (for example, Jovanovic (1979), MacDonald (1982), Chade (2006), and Anderson and Smith (2010)).
There is also the search literature with Bayesian learning where agents are assumed to learn the unknown o¤er
distribution (for example, Rothchild (1974), McLennan (1984), Burdett and Vishwanath (1988), and Adam
(2001)).
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our analysis. In Section 3, rst, we derive a perfect sorting equilibrium (PSE) in which only
persons of the same type marry if all agents know their own types as a benchmark case. In
Section 4, we examine the case of a PSE with imperfect self-knowledge. Next, we investigate
the inuence of optimistic behavior on a marriage market. Finally, we examine the inuence
of pessimistic behavior. In Section 5, we discuss the extensions of the model. Section 6 is the
conclusion.
2 Basic framework
In this section, we present a basic framework for our analysis in this study. Throughout this
section, we restrict our attention to the steady state.
Let us assume that there are a large and equal number of men and women in a marriage
market. Let N denote the participating men or women in this market. An agent in the
market wishes to marry a member of the opposite sex.
Finding a marriage partner always involves a time cost. It is di¢ cult for agents to meet
someone of the opposite sex in the market. Let  denote the rate at which a single individual
contacts a member of the opposite sex, where  is the parameter of the Poisson process.
It is assumed that agents are ex-ante heterogeneous and all agents have the same ranking
about a potential partner in the marriage market. Let xk denote the type (charm) of a k-type
single man or woman in the market; it is assumed to be a real number.
When both sexes meet, each agent can instantly recognize the opponents type and then
decide whether or not to propose. We assume that both agents submit their o¤ers or rejections
simultaneously in order to simplify our analysis. If at least one of the two decides not to
propose, they return to the marriage market and search for another partner. If both agents
propose, they marry and leave the marriage market permanently. We assume that, if a couple
marries, he or she obtains a utility ow equal to the spouses type per unit of time and vice
versa. That is, utilities are non-transferable: there is no bargaining for the division of the
total marital utility. Let us assume that people live forever and there is no divorce.
Let Fi (x) ; i = m;w denote the stationary distribution of actual types among men (m) or
women (w) in the market. That is, Fi (x; t) = Fi (x) for all x and all t, where t is period. Let
us assume that xk is drawn from Fi (x). Let x¯ i
and xi indicate the inmum and supremum of
Fi, respectively, where x¯ i
> 0. Here, Fm (x) and Fw (x) need not be symmetric among men
and women. All agents know Fm (x) and Fw (x).
3 Perfect self-knowledge Benchmark result
In this section, rst, we derive the conditions under which the economy is at a PSE, in
which only persons of the same type marry, if all agents know their own types (perfect
self-knowledge) as a benchmark. In the later section, we study three cases with imperfect
self-knowledge (i.e., agents do not know their own types perfectly) and compare these three
cases with the benchmark case to show the inuence of learning on a market.
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Given (Fm; Fw) and the strategies of single agents, the set of single agents of the opposite
sex who will agree to marry a k-type agent is well dened. Let Hm (:jxk) denote the distrib-
ution of type among men who will agree to marry a k-type woman. Further, the arrival rate
of such proposals faced by a k-type woman, w (xk), is also well dened.
Let Vw (xk) denote a k-type womans expected discounted lifetime utility when single.
Standard dynamic programming arguments imply
Vw (xk) =
1
1+rdt
h
w (xk) dtE
h
max
n
~xk
r ; Vw (xk)
o
jxk
i
+ (1  w (xk) dt)Vw (xk)
i
where, given that an o¤er is made, ~xk has distribution Hm (~xkjxk). Manipulating and then
letting dt! 0 yields
rVw (xk) = w (xk)
h
E
h
max
n
~xk
r ; Vw (xk)
o
jxk
i
  Vw (xk)
i
: (1)
The strategy that maximizes a single agents expected discounted lifetime utility takes
the form of a reservation match strategy a k-type woman will marry a man on contact if
and only if his type is at least as great as Rw (xk)  rVw (xk).
As the situation is the same for men, the expected discounted lifetime utility of a single
k-type man, Vm (xk), satises
rVm (xk) = m (xk)
h
E
h
max
n
~xk
r ; Vm (xk)
o
jxk
i
  Vm (xk)
i
: (2)
where ~xk has distribution Hw (~xkjxk). From this equation, we can obtain the reservation
match strategy of a k-type man Rm (xk)  rVm (xk).
The equilibrium concept for this model with perfect self-knowledge is as follows.
Denition 1 When all agents know their own types, an equilibrium is a Market Equilibrium
with perfect self-knowledge (ME):
(ME-i) all agents maximize their expected discounted utilities given that they have correct
expectations about the strategies of all others in the market;
(ME-ii) the inow of each type and the outow of each type are balanced.
Condition (ME-ii) requires nding a steady state number and distribution of types in the
market so that the corresponding equilibrium strategies dened in condition (ME-i) generate
an exit ow for each type equal to the inow of that type.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that, if a pair marries and leaves the market, two
identical agents enter the market at once (see, for example, MacNamara and Collins (1990),
Morgan (1994), Burdett and Coles (2001), Bloch and Ryder (2000), Cornelius (2003), and
Chade (2006)).8
8Burdett and Coles (1999) give four typical assumptions of inowin search literature. However, our at-
tention is focused not on the change of the type distribution, which is derived under an assumption of inow,
but on the change of matching strategies of others when there are agents with imperfect self-knowledge. In
order to illustrate the main ndings of this paper, one does not need other assumptions of inow, such as ex-
7
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In this paper, let us assume that there are three types of men or women according to
charm: high (H), middle (M), and low (L).9 A participant in a marriage market belongs
to one of these types. Let xk=r denote the (discounted) utility of marrying a k-type agent
(k = H;M;L), where r > 0 is the discount rate. We assume that xH > xM > xL > 0.
That is, in any equilibrium, all agents would like to marry an H-type agent. Both sexes are
assumed to obtain zero utility ow while they are single.
Let ik (i = m;w; k = H;M;L) denote the share of k-type men (m) or women (w) in the
marriage market, where iH + 
i
M + 
i
L = 1. Here, 
i
k of each sex (i = m;w) need not be
symmetric among men and women.
We restrict our attention to the next equilibrium in this paper in order to show the
inuences of the learning process on a marriage market.
Denition 2 In the perfect sorting equilibrium (PSE), H-type agents marry within their
group, as do M -type agents and L-type agents.
In the PSE, men and women of the same type marry. Therefore, we can consider that
H-type agents who marry within their group form the rst cluster of marriages, M -type
agents who marry within their group form the second cluster of marriages, and L-type agents
who marry within their group form the third cluster of marriages in this equilibrium. We
now dene the following situation as a benchmark case: if all agents know their own types,
the ME is the PSE. Proposition 1 shows the su¢ cient conditions for the PSE when all agents
know their own types.
Proposition 1 (PSE) Let us assume that all agents recognize their own types. The economy
is at the PSE if
xM < R

i (xH)  
j
HxH
jH+r
; i = m;w; j = w;m (3)
and
xL < R

i (xM )  
j
MxM
jM+r
; i = m;w; j = w;m: (4)
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Proposition 1 means that, with constant , if the share of H-type agents of the opposite
sex j is large enough or if the di¤erence between xH and xM is large enough (
j
H >
rxM
(xH xM )),
an H-type agent turns down an M - and an L-type opposite sex agent in the market. Con-
versely, if there are su¢ ciently few H-type opposite sex agents or if (xH xM ) is small enough
(jH  rxM(xH xM )), an H-type agent accepts an M -type opposite sex agent j. A similar dis-
cussion can be held for parameter jM by inequality (4). If 
j
H and 
j
M are small enough
ogenous inow, which complicates matters without adding intuition. Thus, we apply the cloning assumption
to our model for technical simplicity.
9As we will discuss in detail in Appendix B, we assume not two but three types of agents in order to show
the indirect e¤ect (indirect externality) of the learning process: even if the agents with perfect self-knowledge
do not directly meet agents with imperfect self-knowledge, these agents with perfect self-knowledge may change
their marriage behavior due to the existence of agents with imperfect self-knowledge in the market.
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(j = w;m) to satisfy Ri (xH)  xL and Ri (xM )  xL, all agents i (= m;w) obtain the same
expected discounted lifetime utility: Vi (xL) = Vi (xM ) = Vi (xH) <
xL
r .
10
If r = 0, then xM < Ri (xH) and xL < R

i (xM ) (i = m;w) hold. Therefore, the equilib-
rium is the PSE when r = 0.
In the next section, we introduce the imperfect knowledge about agentsown types into
the benchmark case. To investigate the inuence of the learning on a market, in the following
sections, we consider the case in which the conditions in Proposition 1 are satised: xM <
Ri (xH) and xL < R

i (xM ) (i = m;w) hold.
11
4 Imperfect self-knowledge
In this section, we introduce the imperfect self-knowledge into the benchmark case. Let us
assume that all agents understand the (actual) type distributions Fm (x) and Fw (x) and that
all men know their own types. However, no women initially know their own types when
they have just entered the marriage market.12 A woman with imperfect self-knowledge may
learn something about her actual type by observing the o¤ers or rejections by men. Thus,
a womans belief about her own type depends on the men whom she met in the past. As
a result, there are di¤erent kinds of women with di¤erent beliefs even if they belong to the
same actual type.
For the explanation, suppose that a k-type woman is at the start of period t = f0; 1; :::g of
single. Let  denote a set of all (actual) types of women and b0k 2 () denote a prior belief
for a k-type woman, where () is the set of probability distributions over . Let btk
 
b0k; h
t
k

denote a k-type womans belief at the start of period t about her own type after history
htk given the prior belief b
0
k, where b
0
k
 
b0k; h
0
k

= b0k. In this paper, we assume that b
0
k is the
distribution of new single women over the levels of charm.13 Thus, b0  b0k. Moreover, htk =  
~x0k; a
0
m (xk)

; :::;
 
~xt 1k ; a
t 1
m (xk)

is the k-type womans history up to, but not including,
period t and atm (xk) 2 A = fa; a g is the action of a man observed by the k-type woman
as the result of a search outcome in period t, where a indicates that the man proposed the
k-type woman and a  indicates that he rejected her. If a k-type woman observes
 
~xtk; a

(or
 
~xtk; a
 ), she knows that a k-type man accepted (rejected) her. In this paper, we use
10When Fm (x) and Fw (x) are symmetric, four possible steady-state equilibrium outcomes can be considered
when all agents have perfect self-knowledge: Equilibrium (i) agents of the same type marry (PSE); Equilibrium
(ii): agents of the H-type and the M -type form the rst cluster of marriages, and agents of the L-type form
the second cluster of marriages; Equilibrium (iii) agents of the H-type form the rst cluster of marriages, and
agents of the middle- and L-type form the second cluster of marriages; and Equilibrium (iv) all agents marry
the rst person of the opposite sex they meet. From the proof of Proposition 1, Equilibrium (ii) occurs when
Ri (xH)  xM ; Ri (xM ) > xL. Equilibrium (iii) occurs when Ri (xH) > xM ; Ri (xM )  xL:Equilibrium (iv)
occurs when Ri (xH)  xM ; Ri (xM )  xL.
11For other parameter ranges, it is di¢ cult to show the indirect e¤ect (indirect externality) of the learning
process. We will discuss this in detail in Appendix B.
12This one-sided imperfect knowledge assumption can make the inuence of imperfect self-knowledge clearer
than the two-sided imperfect knowledge assumption. We discuss this in detail in Section 5.
13Gonzalez and Shi (2009) assume that the initial prior expectation of ability for a new worker is calculated
from the distribution of new workers over the levels of ability. In our model, the initial prior expectation of
charm for a new single woman also depends on the distribution of new single women over the levels of charm.
This distribution consists of the shares of women with belief b0k in the market.
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the term actionto distinguish it from the reservation strategy.Specically, in our model
with discrete types, even if an agent lowers his (her) reservation utility strategy, this does
not guarantee that he (she) accepts a woman (man) whom he (she) has rejected previously.
Therefore, in the following analysis, the statement that an agent changes his (her) action
means that he (she) changes the type of women (men) whom he (she) is willing to accept.
Let btk
 
b0; h
t
k

(xk) denote a k-type womans probability assigned to the particular type
xk 2 . This probability is determined by Bayesrule. The k-type womans posterior belief
bt+1k
 
b0; h
t
kj
 
~xtk; a
t
m (xk)

(xk) after observing
 
~xtk; a
t
m (xk)

at period t given her current
belief btk
 
b0; h
t
k

is given by
bt+1k
 
b0; h
t
kj
 
~xtk; a
t
m (xk)

(xk) =
btk(b0;h
t
k)(xk) Pr((~x
t
k;a
t
m(xk))jxk)P
xk2 b
t
k(b0;h
t
k)(xk)Pr((~xtk;atm(xk))jxk)
;
where bt+1k
 
b0; h
t+1
k

(xk) = b
t+1
k
 
b0; h
t
kj
 
~xtk; a
t
m (xk)

(xk). In what follows, because b0 is
xed in this paper, we omit writing explicitly b0.
Because we consider only pure strategies when self-knowledge is perfect in the model
presented here, Pr
  
~xtk; a
t
m (xk)
 jxk = 0 or 1 when a k-type woman observes  ~xtk; atm (xk)
given the strategies of men. Because Pr
  
~xtk; a
t
m (xk)
 jxk = 0 or 1, given  ~xtk; atm (xk), htk
and strategies of men, a k-type woman knows that her actual type does not belong to a type
set. Let tk
  
~xtk; a
t
m (xk)

; htk

denote the impossible type set of a k-type woman, which she
recognizes by observing
 
~xtk; a
t
m (xk)

given htk and strategies of men. Then, we can dene
the set of the k-type womans remaining possible types at the period t + 1 recursively. Let
t+1k = 
t
knt
  
~xtk; a
t
m (xk)

; htk

denote the set of the k-type womans remaining possible
types at the start of period t + 1, where 0k = : It is noteworthy that the set 
t
k can be
interpreted as an information set in a sequential-move game. Because tk depends on h
t
k, to
simplify notation we write btk
 
htk

as btk
 
tk

in the following analysis.
Let Vw
 
btk
 
tk

denote the lifetime expected discounted utility of a k-type woman at the
start of period t conditional on her belief btk
 
tk

. Thus,
Vw
 
btk
 
tk

=
X
xk2tk
btk
 
tk

(xk)Vw
 
btk
 
tk

= 11+rdt
X
xk2tk
btk
 
tk

(xk)
"  
1  w
 
btk
 
tk

dt

Vw
 
btk
 
tk

+w
 
btk
 
tk

dtE

max
n
~xk
r ; Vw
 
bt+1k
 
tkj
 
~xtk; a
t
m (xk)
o jxk
#
:
where ~xk has distribution Hm (~xkjxk). Manipulating and then letting dt! 0 yields
rVw
 
btk
 
tk

=
X
xk2tk
btk
 
tk

(xk)w
 
btk
 
tk
 h
E

max
n
~xk
r ; Vw
 
bt+1k
 
t+1k
o jxk  Vw  btk  tki :
(5)
where bt+1k
 
t+1k

= bt+1k
 
tkj
 
~xtk; a
t
m (xk)

. Because Vw
 
btk
 
tk

depends only on btk
 
tk

,
women in the same information set tk at period t face the same decision problem regardless
of their actual types.
In this paper, because we consider the three-types case, a woman learns about her
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own type at most three times and there are at most six kinds of information sets: 0 
 = fxH ; xM ; xLg, HM  fxH ; xMg, ML  fxM ; xLg, H  fxHg, M  fxMg, and
L  fxLg. Therefore, from now on, we remove the superscript t from the notations of
the state variables for the sake of simplicity because the changes of belief over time can
be represented by the elements of tk. In the following analysis, let us call a kl-type
woman and a k-type woman as a woman whose actual type is k 2 fH;M;Lg with be-
lief bk (l) ; l 2 f0;HM;ML;H;M;Lg; and a woman whose actual type is k 2 fH;M;Lg
with any belief, respectively. Moreover, we write bl and blj(~xtk;am(xk)) instead of bk (l) and
bk
 
lj
 
~xtk; am (xk)

, respectively.14
Let Gm (x) and Gw (x) denote the stationary distribution of mens belief and that of
womens belief, respectively. That is, Gi (x; t) = Gi (x) for all x and all t. Let us assume
that all agents also know Gm (x) and Gw (x) (we later show that Gm (x) and Gw (x) depend
on  and Fi (x), which are common knowledge among all agents) and believe the market is
characterized by (Gm; Gw). Because all men know their own types, Gm (x) = Fm (x).
We introduce an equilibrium concept for our model with imperfect self-knowledge. Al-
though each womans belief (state) changes over time, we now focus on the market in a steady
state.
Denition 3 In a Market Equilibrium with imperfect self-knowledge (MEI)(R (xk),R (bl),Gm,Gw):
(MEI-i) the agent strategies satisfy sequential rationality;
(MEI-ii) the agent beliefs at the sets of remaining possible types (the information sets)
along the equilibrium path are consistent with Bayesian updating given the equilibrium strate-
gies;
(MEI-iii) an exit ow of each belief in each actual type equals the entry rate of that belief
in that type.
We consider the following three MEI in the following subsections. First, we consider
the case of PSE with imperfect self-knowledge. Next, we nd the Type 1 equilibrium to
show that the optimism by some women has two externalities. Finally, we nd the Type 2
equilibrium to show that the pessimism by some women has an externality. These equilibria
satisfy (MEI-i)(MEI-iii).
4.1 PSE with imperfect self-knowledge
In this subsection, we discuss the PSE with imperfect self-knowledge (PSEI) in which agents
of the same type marry, when there are women with imperfect self-knowledge. Therefore,
k0-type (k = H;M;L) women always rejectM -type men.15 Moreover, H-type women always
rejectM -type men,M -type women always reject L-type men, and some L-type women always
accept L-type men.
Distribution of beliefs of women in the PSEI
14When t = 0, b0 = b0.
15Otherwise, the PSEI does not occur as men and women of di¤erent types marry.
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To obtain the MEI, rst, we derive the distribution of beliefs of women GPw (x) in the
PSEI. This distribution is derived in Appendix A.1.1.
Matching strategies and a market equilibrium
Men decide their optimal strategies given GPi (i = m;w) and womens actions (who
accepts (or rejects) whom) in the market. Because all agents know GPi (x), the strategy of
each type is common knowledge among all agents.
An H-type man has the same reservation level as an H-type man in the PSE because all
women want to marry H-type men. Given the strategies of H-type men, the decision of an
M -type man is as follows. Because a fraction  2 (0; 1) of M -type women accept M -type
men and a fraction  2 (0; 1) of L-type women accept M -type men, the following lemma
applies to an M -type man.
Lemma 1 Let us assume that Ri (xH) > xM ; R

i (xM ) > xL (i = m;w) ; and that  2
(0; 1) of M -type women accept M -type men and  2 (0; 1) of L-type women accept M -type
men. If
xL < () RPm (xM )  
w
MxM
(r+wM)
; (6)
an M -type man rejects (accepts) an L-type woman. In this case, the reservation level of
an M -type man for an L-type woman decreases, in contrast with the benchmark result, i.e.,
Rm (xM ) > RPm (xM ). In the PSEI,  =
mH
mH+
m
M
and  =
mH
m
L +
m
M(
m
H+
m
M)
(mL +
m
M)(
m
H+
m
M)
hold.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Lemma 1 means that the rejections of M -type men by some M -type women with im-
perfect self-knowledge lower the reservation utility level of an M -type man for an L-type
woman. It is noteworthy that the result Rm (xM ) > RPm (xM ) does not depend on the cloning
assumption. This is because one can obtain the results of Lemma 1, except  = 
m
H
mH+
m
M
and
 =
mH
m
L +
m
M(
m
H+
m
M)
(mL +
m
M)(
m
H+
m
M)
; given a stationary market environment (i.e., Fi (x) and Gi (x) are
stationary distributions).16
With constant , if wM is small enough (
w
M  rxL(xM xL)), an M -type man accepts
an L-type woman. Conversely, if there are enough M -type women who accept M -type men
(wM >
rxL
(xM xL)), an M -type man turns down an L-type woman.
Next, we investigate the optimal strategies of women. Women decide their optimal strate-
gies given GPi (i = m;w) and mens actions. The optimal strategies of women are obtained
in the next lemma.
Lemma 2 Let us assume that Ri (xH) > xM and R

i (xM ) > xL (i = m;w) : Furthermore,
let us suppose that an M -type man rejects an L-type woman and an L-type man accepts an
L-type woman. If
xL < () 
m
MxM(r+
m
L )(bPML(xM ))
r(r+mL +
m
M)+2
m
L 
m
M(bPML(xM ))
 RPw (bML) ; (7)
16At this time, the equilibrium condition (MEI-iii) is not needed.
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a kML-type (k =M;L) woman rejects (accepts) an L-type man. If
xM < () 
m
HxH(r+
m
M)(bPHM (xH))
r(r+mH+
m
M)+2
m
H
m
M(bPHM (xH))
 RPw (bHM ) = RPw (b0) ; (8)
a kHM -type (k = H;M) or a k0-type (k = H;M;L) woman rejects (accepts) an M -type man.
Moreover, RPw (bML) < R

w (xM ) = R
P
w (bM )  xM < RPw (bHM ) = RPw (b0) < Rw (xH) holds.
Here, bPML (xM ) =
mH
w
M(
m
L +
m
M)
mL 
w
L(
m
H+
m
M)+
m
H
w
M(
m
L +
m
M)
and bPHM (xH) =
wH(
m
H+
m
M)
wH(
m
H+
m
M)+
m
M
w
M
in the
PSEI.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Lemma 2 means that a kML-type woman rejects (accepts) an L-type man if there are
enough (few enough) M -type men or if bPML (xM ) is su¢ ciently large (su¢ ciently small).
Similarly, a kHM - or k0-type woman rejects (accepts) an M -type man if there are enough
(few enough) H-type men or if bPHM (xH) is su¢ ciently large (su¢ ciently small).
Lemma 2 shows that the reservation level of a k0-type woman for an M -type man is the
same as that of a kHM -type woman. If the actual type of a k0-type woman is the L-type,
she is rejected by H- and M -type men regardless of her own action. Therefore, the decision
of a k0-type woman regarding whether or not to accept an M -type man does not depend on
the possibility that her actual type is the L-type. Hence, even if a k0-type woman becomes a
kHM -type woman by meeting an M -type man, her decision does not change.
Women with imperfect self-knowledge assign probabilities to their own types. Therefore,
the reservation utility levels of MML-type women, HHM -type women, and H0-type women
are lowered in contrast with the benchmark results. On the other hand, the reservation utility
levels of LML-type women, MHM -type women, and k0-type (k =M;L) women are raised in
contrast with the PSE.
When r = 0, RPw (bML) = R

i (xM ) (= xM ) holds. Therefore, a kML-type woman always
prefers to meet an M -type man over accepting an L-type man in order to have the chance of
conrming her actual type.17 This is because, if the actual type of a kML-type woman is an
L-type, she would marry an L-type man sooner or later regardless of her action. At this time,
she obtains the same value when she is single regardless of her action due to a lack of time-
consuming cost (r = 0). Hence, the possibility that the actual type of a kML-type woman is
an L-type does not a¤ect her own decision. Consequently, the decision of a kML-type woman
is the same as that of an M -type woman with perfect self-knowledge.
If r > 0, the possibility that the actual type of a kML-type woman is an L-type a¤ects
her own decision. The agents with imperfect self-knowledge need to take into account the
time-consuming cost due to the learning process.18 When a kML-type woman is an L-type,
she is refused by an M -type man. It is then desirable for an LML-type woman to accept an
L-type man before thoroughly understanding her own type. Therefore, the reservation level
17An LML-type woman will be optimistic as she raises her reservation utility to reject an L-type man. We
will analyze the inuence of optimism on a market in Subsection 4.2.
18Therefore, in our model, it is possible that a woman with imperfect self-knowledge could marry before
thoroughly understanding her own type.
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of a kML-type (k =M;L) woman is lower than that in the case of r = 0.19
A similar discussion could be presented for RPw (bHM ) = R
P
w (b0) = R

w (xH) (= xH) when
r = 0.
It is noteworthy that similar to Lemma 1, the results of Lemma 2, except the value of
bPML (xM ) and that of b
P
HM (xH), do not depend on the cloning assumption.
From Lemmas 1 and 2, we then immediately obtain su¢ cient conditions for the PSEI.
Proposition 2 Let us assume that xM < Ri (xH) and xL < R

i (xM ) (i = m;w) hold. If
RPm (xM ) > xL, R
P
w (bML) > xL, and R
P
w (bHM ) = R
P
w (b0) > xM , then there exists the PSEI
in which H-type agents form the rst cluster of marriages, M -type men and MML- and MM -
type women, the second cluster, and L-type men and LL1- and LL2-type women, the third
cluster.
Proof. Omitted.
The implications of Proposition 2 are as follows: if there are enoughH-type men orH-type
women (RPw (bHM ) = R
P
w (b0) > xM ), an M -type man is rejected by a k0-type (k = H;M;L)
or kHM -type (k = H;M) woman. When there are enough MM - and MML-type women
(RPm (xM ) > xL), an M -type man rejects an L-type woman.
20 When there are enough M -
type men or MML-type women (RPw (bML) > xL), a kML-type (k = M;L) woman rejects
an L-type man. However, when an LML-type woman rejects an L-type man, she becomes
an LL-type woman sooner or later because of being rejected by an M -type man. Then, an
LL-type woman accepts an L-type man. As a result, the PSEI occurs. It is noteworthy that
the rst cluster of marriages is not inuenced by women who are unaware of their own types.
When RPm (xM ) > xL, the M -type mans rate of contact with a woman whom he wishes
to marry is wM . Then, an M -type mans time (duration) until meeting such a woman is
1
wM
. Therefore, his time until marriage is delayed due to the rejections fromM -type women
with imperfect self-knowledge because his time until marriage in the benchmark case is 1wM .
This delay of marriage is the direct negative externality of optimism. Moreover, the marriages
of all agents, except those of H-type men and some H-type women who meet H-type men
in their rst encounter, are delayed due to the refusals by the women who are learning their
own types.21 Therefore, the welfare of each type of women in the PSEI is always lower than
that in the PSE because their marriages are delayed due to their own learning. The welfare
19 If a kML-type woman lowers her RPw (bML) to accept an L-type man whom she rejects when she knows
her own type, an MML-type woman will apparently underestimate her own type. We will analyze these e¤ects
of pessimism in Subsection 4.3.
20The share of MM -type and that of MML-type women in the market depend on mH . Therefore, if there
are many H-type men, there will be many MM - and MML-type women.
21The duration until marriage of each agent can be obtained easily. In the PSE, the duration until marriage
of k-type man (woman) is 1
i
k
(i = m;w; k = H;M;L). However, in the PSEI, the duration until marriage
of an M -type man is 1
w
M
mH+
m
M
m
H
, that of an L-type man is 1
w
L
mL +
m
M
m
M
, that of an HHM -type woman is
1
m
H
m
M
, that of an MML-type woman is 1m
H
m
M
, that of an MM -type woman is 1m
H
m
M
m
L
, that of an
LL1-type woman is 1m
H
m
M
m
L
, and that of an LL2-type woman is 1m
M
m
L
. Therefore, their marriages are
delayed by the learning process of women.
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of each type of men, except H-type men, also decreases because of the rejections from women
with imperfect self-knowledge.
4.2 Inuence of optimism on a market
In this subsection, we investigate the e¤ects of optimism: a woman with imperfect self-
knowledge rejects a man whom, when she knows her own type, she accepts.
One e¤ect is the direct negative externality of optimism that is obtained in Subsection
4.1. More precisely, we dene the direct externality of optimism as the situation in which a
man who is now rejected by an optimistic woman lowers his reservation level relative to the
benchmark case because of the delay of marriage, but he does not change his action. In a
two-sided search model, if the above man lowers his reservation level to change his action, the
woman who is now accepted by him may also change her action. Therefore, in this subsection,
we investigate the inuence of some womens optimism on the actions of the others, including
the agents who are not directly rejected by the optimistic women.
For this reason, we will nd a Type 1 equilibrium (Type 1) in which H-type men reject
M -type women, M - and L-type men accept L-type women, k0-type (k = H;M;L) women
reject M -type men, and kML-type (k = M;L) women reject L-type men. In other words,
M0-, L0-, and LML-type women are optimistic.22
Distribution of beliefs of women in the Type 1
To obtain the MEI, rst, we derive the distribution of beliefs of women GT1w (x) in the
Type 1. This is derived in Appendix A.1.2.
Matching strategies and a market equilibrium
First, we investigate the optimal strategies of men. An H-type man has the same reser-
vation level as an H-type man in the PSE because all women want to marry H-type men.
As an H0- or M0-type woman rejects an M -type man, the option of an M -type man is
to marry or to reject an L-type woman. In the same manner as in Lemma 1, from Fig-
ure 2, we immediately obtain the reservation level of an M -type man for an L-type woman
RT1m (xM )  
w
MxM
r+wM
(< Rm (xM )), where  =
mH
mH+
m
M
in the Type 1. An L-type man also
accepts an L-type woman if an M -type man accepts an L-type woman.
Next, we investigate the strategies of women given mens strategies (or actions). The
optimal strategies of women are obtained in the next lemma.
Lemma 3 Let us assume that xM < Ri (xH) and xL < R

i (xM ) (i = m;w) and that an
M - or L-type man accepts an L-type woman. At this time, a kML-type woman (k = M;L)
rejects an L-type man (RT1w (bML) = R

w (xM )). On the other hand, a k0-type woman rejects
22Of course, we can consider another equilibrium in order to describe the optimistic behavior. However, at
this time, we cannot show that optimism prevents the lowest-type agents from marrying in our model with
three types of agents (for the details, see Appendix B). Hence, we focus on the Type 1.
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(accepts) an M -type man if
xM < () 
m
HxH(r+
m
M)(bT10 (xH))
r(r+mH+
m
M)+2
m
H
m
M(bT10 (xH))
 RT1w (b0) : (9)
Moreover, RT1w (b0) < R

w (xH). In the Type 1, b
T1
0 (xH) =
wH(
m
H+
m
M)
mH
w
H+
m
M
.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Lemma 3 suggests that a k0-type woman rejects an M -type man if there are enough H-
type men or H-type women. On the other hand, because an M -type man accepts an L-type
woman, an MML-type woman and an LML-type woman face the same problem. As a result,
a kML-type (k =M;L) woman turns down an L-type man, because there are enoughM -type
men (xL < Rw (xM )).23
Given matching strategies of men and women in the Type 1, we immediately obtain
Proposition 3. In this equilibrium, the optimism of M0-type women prevents the lowest-type
men from marrying.
Proposition 3 Let us assume that xM < Ri (xH) and xL < R

i (xM ) (i = m;w) hold.
If RT1w (b0) > xM and R
T1
m (xM )  xL, there exists the Type 1 in which H-type agents form
the rst cluster of marriages, M -type men and MML-type women, the second cluster, and
M -type men and LML-type women, the third cluster. In this equilibrium, L-type men can
never marry.
Proof. Omitted.
The implications of Proposition 3 are as follows: when there are enough H-type men or
H-type women (RT1w (b0) > xM ), a k0-type woman rejects an M -type man. If there are few
enoughMML-type women (RT1m (xM )  xL), anM -type man changes his action compared to
the benchmark case; he accepts an L-type woman. This leads an MML- or LML-type woman
to refuse the o¤er by an L-type man (RPw (bML) = R

w (xM ) > xL). As a result, an L-type
man can never marry.24
From Proposition 3, when there are many optimistic women in the market, the indirect
externality of optimism occurs: the men who are now rejected by optimistic women change
their actions; i.e., they accept another lower type of women whom, when all agents know
their own types, they reject. Given this fact, in a two-sided search, the women who are now
accepted by these men may also change their actions. As a result, there is a case in which
someones optimism generates the agents who cannot marry.
The welfare ofM -type women in the Type 1 is always lower than that in the PSE because
their marriages are delayed due to their own learning. The welfare of L-type men is also
lower because they cannot get married. On the other hand, because M -type men accept
23Similar to Lemma 2, the results of Lemma 3, except the value of bT10 (xH), do not depend on the cloning
assumption.
24The share of kML-type women (k = M;L) depends on the share of H-type men mH . However, even if
Fm (x) and Fw (x) are symmetric, RT1m (xM )  xL and RT1w (b0) > xM hold in some parameter ranges (see
Example 1).
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both M - and L-type women, their welfare increases or decreases as a whole, depending on
xk(k =M;L) and the shapes of Fm (x) and Fw (x). Although L-type women marry M -type
men, their welfare also increases or decreases as a whole, depending on Fm (x), Fw (x), and
xk(k =M;L).
In the next subsection, we investigate the e¤ects of pessimism.
4.3 Inuence of pessimism on a market
In this subsection, we investigate the e¤ects of pessimism: a woman with imperfect self-
knowledge accepts a man whom, when she knows her own type, she rejects. From Lemma 2,
if r > 0 is large, a woman with imperfect knowledge would tend to be pessimistic.
The pessimism of a woman makes the future partner better o¤ because she increases the
value of the match to the partner. Therefore, the pessimism increases the reservation level
of the men who are now accepted by pessimistic women. If these men raise their reservation
levels but do not change their actions, we call this e¤ect the direct (positive) externality of
pessimism.
On the other hand, the pessimism has no indirect externality. To establish this fact by
proof by contradiction, we have to investigate all cases in which indirect externality occurs:
if there are enough pessimistic women, the men who are now accepted by these pessimistic
women reject the women whom they accept when all agents know their own types.
The next Lemma shows that the indirect externality of the pessimism does not occur.
Lemma 4 Let us assume that xM < Ri (xH) and xL < R

i (xM ) (i = m;w).
 When there are pessimistic MML-type women who accept L-type men, an L-type man
always accepts an L-type woman.
 When there are pessimistic H0- or HHM -type women who accept M -type men, an M -
type man always accepts an M -type woman.
 When there are pessimistic k0- or kHM -type women (k = H;M) who accept L-type
men, an L-type man always accepts an L-type woman.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Lemma 4 shows that the pessimism does not have the indirect externality. For example,
if an L-type man rejects an L-type woman because of the expectation to marry a pessimistic
MML-type woman, the proposal from him to anMML-type woman informs her that she is the
M -type. As a result, a kML-type woman has the incentive to reject an L-type man because
she prefers to have the chance of learning her actual type than to accept an L-type man.25
This contradicts the assumption that a kML-type woman accepts an L-type man. Therefore,
an L-type man does not change his action even if there are enough pessimistic MML-type
25 If the actual type of a kML-type woman is the L-type, she is rejected by an M -type or an L-type man
regardless of her actions. Hence, the possibility that she is an L-type does not a¤ect her decision regarding
whether to accept or not an L-type man.
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women for L-type men to reject L-type women. Similarly, the other pessimistic behaviors by
women do not have the indirect externality.
Lemma 4 also shows that the reservation level of a woman with imperfect self-knowledge
never rises even if she receives an o¤er that has some information about her own type. An
o¤er from a man whom she decides whether to accept or not does not a¤ect her decision in
equilibrium, because the man chooses his strategy so as not to raise her reservation level.
An o¤er much lower than her reservation level is proposed by a man whom the woman with
imperfect self-knowledge rejects. At this time, her decision is also not a¤ected by that o¤er
because she decides whether to accept or not another type of man. A high o¤er results in the
agent getting married similarly to the nding by Burdett and Vishwanath (1988). However,
in their model, workers learn the unknown wage distribution. In contrast, our model is a
two-sided search and single agents know the type distribution but do not know their own
types.
On the other hand, the rejections from a man decrease the reservation utility level of
a woman with imperfect self-knowledge when k0-type women reject M -type men.26 From
Lemmas 2 and 4, we obtain the next lemma.
Lemma 5 Let us assume that Ri (xH) > xM and R

i (xM ) > xL (i = m;w) and that k0-type
women reject M -type men. If a rejection from a man has some information about a woman
with imperfect self-knowledge, the rejection from him for her decreases her reservation utility
level.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Burdett and Vishwanath (1988) show that an o¤er much lower than expected leads the
worker to revise his or her reservation wage downward. In contrast, this result shows that if
women with imperfect self-knowledge start to search with the strategies of accepting only the
highest type of men, a woman revises her reservation level downward whenever she receives
a rejection that has some information about her own type.
The results of Lemmas 4 and 5 can be obtained when Fi (x) and Gi (x) are stationary
distributions. Hence, these results do not depend on the cloning assumption.
Next, we show that the pessimism has direct externality. To reuse the framework of the
PSEI in what follows, let us consider a Type 2 equilibrium (Type 2) in which H-type men
reject M -type women, M -type men reject L-type women, L-type men accept L-type women,
k0-type (k = H;M;L) and kHM -type (k = H;M) women reject M -type men, and kML-type
(k =M;L) women accept L-type men. In other words, MML-type women are pessimistic.27
26When a k0-type woman accepts an M -type man and rejects an L-type man, there exists a case in which a
rejection from a H-type man increases the reservation level of a woman with imperfect self-knowledge. In this
case, we only have to investigate whether Rw (b0) is higher than Rw (bML) (and whether Rw (bML) is higher
than Rw (bL)) because there are no kHM -type women. However, if a kML-type woman rejects an L-type man,
Rw (b0) is higher or lower than Rw (bML), depending on the actual type distributions Fi (x) ; (i = m;w).
Note that if Fi (x) is the discrete uniform distribution (i.e., ik =
1
3
(i = m;w; k = H;M;L)), Rw (b0) >
Rw (bML) holds.
27Of course, we can consider another equilibrium in order to describe the pessimistic behavior. At this time,
we can qualitatively obtain the same results as in Proposition 4 below.
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Distribution of beliefs of women in the Type 2
We then obtain the distribution of beliefs of women in the Type 2 (GT2w (x)) in Appendix
A.1.3.
Matching strategies and a market equilibrium
Let us investigate the strategies of men. An H-type man has the same reservation level
as an H-type man in the PSE. In the same manner as in Lemma 1, the reservation level
of an M -type man for an L-type woman RT2m (xM ) =
(2+22)
w
MxM
(r+(2+22)wM)
(< Rm (xM )), where
(2 + 22) =
mH
mH+(
m
M+
m
L )(
m
H+
m
M)
in the Type 2, is obtained. From Lemma 4, an L-type
man accepts an L-type woman, even if there are enough pessimistic MML-type women.
Next, the optimal strategies of women are obtained in the next lemma.
Lemma 6 Let us assume that xM < Ri (xH) and xL < R

i (xM ) (i = m;w) and that an
M -type man rejects an L-type woman. If
xL < ()RT2w (bML) 
mMxM(r+
m
L )(bT2ML(xM ))
r(r+mL +
m
M)+2
m
L 
m
M(bT2ML(xM ))
; (10)
a kML-type woman (k =M;L) rejects (accepts) an L-type man. If
xM < ()RT2w (bHM ) 
mHxH(r+
m
M)(bT2HM (xH))
r(r+mH+
m
M)+2
m
H
m
M(bT2HM (xH))
= RT2w (b0) ; (11)
a kHM -type (k = H;M) and a k0-type (k = H;M;L) woman reject (accept) an M -type man.
Moreover, RT2w (bML) < R

w (xM ) = R
T2
w (bM ) and R
T2
w (bHM ) = R
T2
w (b0) < R

w (xH) hold.
Here, bT2ML (xM ) =
mH
w
M(
m
L +
m
M)
wL
m
L (
m
H+
m
H
m
L +
m
M)+
m
H
w
M(
m
L +
m
M)
and bT2HM (xH) =
wH(
m
H+(
m
H+
m
M)(
m
L +
m
M))
mH
w
H+(
m
L +
m
M)(
m
H+
m
M)(
w
H+
w
M)
in the Type 2.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Lemma 6 implies the following: except the value of bT2ML (xM ) and that of b
T2
HM (xH),
Equations (10) and (11) have the same form as Equations (7) and (8), respectively. However,
the di¤erence between the PSEI and the Type 2 is whether or not kML-type women accept
L-type men. As a result, GPw (x) and G
T2
w (x) are di¤erent and then b
T2
ML (xM ) and b
T2
HM (xH)
are di¤erent.
From RT2m (xM ) and Lemma 6, we immediately have Proposition 4 for the Type 2. In this
equilibrium, pessimism has direct externality.
Proposition 4 (Type 2) Let us assume that xM < Ri (xH) and xL < R

i (xM ) (i = m;w). If
xM < R
T2
w (bHM ) = R
T2
w (b0) and R
T2
w (bML)  xL < RT2m (xM ), then there exists the Type 2
in which H-type agents form the rst cluster of marriages, M -type men and MML-type and
MM -type women, the second cluster, L-type men and MML-type women, the third cluster,
and L-type men and LML-type, LL1-type, and LL2-type women, the fourth cluster.
Proof. Omitted.
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The implications of Proposition 4 are as follows: there is the direct externality of pes-
simism in the Type 2, in which all agents can marry. If there are enough H-type men and
H-type women (xM < RT2w (bHM )), an M -type man is rejected by a k0-type and a kHM -type
woman. Moreover, a large mH implies a large share ofMM - andMML-type women inM -type
women. If there are enough MM - and MML-type women (xL < RT2m (xM )), an M -type man
rejects an L-type woman. If there are few enough MML-type women satisfying RT2w (bML)
 xL
 
< RT2m (xM )

, a kML-type woman accepts an L-type man. This is because she assigns
low probability to being an M -type woman. However, as an L-type man accepts an L-type
woman, all agents can marry sooner or later.
The welfare of L-type women in the Type 2 is always lowered due to their own learning,
relative to those in the PSE. The welfare of M -type men also decreases because these men
are rejected by M0- and MHM -type women. The MML-type women who marry L-type men
obtain lower utilities than M -type women with perfect self-knowledge. However, as MML-
type women in the Type 2 can marry earlier than M -type women in the PSE, the welfare
of M -type women increases or decreases as a whole, depending on Fm (x), Fw (x), and xk
(k =M;L). Because L-type men marry M - and L-type women, their welfare also increases
or decreases depending on Fm (x), Fw (x), and xk (k =M;L).
Propositions 3, 4 and Lemma 4 suggest that, whereas optimism has an indirect externality,
pessimism does not have indirect externality. This di¤erence depends on the agents whom
the indirect externality rst a¤ects. In the case of pessimism, some M -type women with
imperfect self-knowledge accept L-type men. Given this, if an L-type man rejects an L-type
woman, his o¤er to a pessimistic M -type woman informs her that she belongs to a higher
type than she believes. Hence, the indirect externality of pessimism does not occur. On the
other hand, in the case of optimism, even if an M -type man accepts an L-type woman due
to the existence of many optimistic M -type women, the acceptance of an L-type woman by
an M -type man makes an L-type woman better o¤. Therefore, the indirect externality of
optimism remains.28
When all agents know their own types under the cloning assumption and the assumption
of non-transferable utility, a unique equilibrium always occurs (see Burdett and Coles (1997)).
However, if there are agents with imperfect self-knowledge under the cloning assumption and
the non-transferable utility, it is possible that multiple equilibria occur. From Propositions
2, 3, and 4, in some parameter ranges, multiple equilibria can occur; both the PSEI and the
Type 2 can exist. To clarify this point, we consider the next example.
Example 1 Let us assume that 2 > 3r and that Fm (x) and Fw (x) are discrete uniform
distributions: ik =
1
3 , (i = m;w; k = H;M;L). At this time, the su¢ cient conditions
28 In the Type 1, as M -type men accept the lowest type of women (that is, L-type women), his o¤er carries
no information about types of women. Then, an L- or M -type woman learns nothing from his o¤er. However,
if there are a lower type than L-typeand if an M -type man accepts an L-typewoman, an L- or M -type
woman will learn something about her own type from the acceptance by an M -type man. However, this
acceptance will still make an L-type woman better o¤. Then, the indirect externality of optimism would
remain in this case.
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for the PSEI become RPw (b0) =
(3r+)2xH
18r+22+27r2
> xM and RPm (xM ) =
xM
6r+ > R
P
w (bML) =
(3r+)xM
12r+2+18r2
> xL from Proposition 2. Similarly, the su¢ cient conditions for the Type 1 are
RT1w (b0) =
(3r+)xH
12r+2+18r2
> xM and RT1m (xM ) =
xM
6r+  xL from Proposition 3. The su¢ cient
conditions for the Type 2 are xM < RT2w (bHM ) = R
T2
w (b0) =
(3r+)7xH
66r+72+99r2
and RT2m (xL) =
xM
21r+ < R
T2
w (bML) =
(3r+)2xM
26r+22+39r2
 xL < RT2m (xM ) = xM7r+ from Proposition 4. The Type
2 and the Type 1 do not hold because RT2m (xM ) RT1m (xM ) =   rxM(7r+)(6r+) < 0. Moreover,
as RT1m (xM ) = R
P
m (xM ), the PSEI and the Type 1 do not hold either.
29 However, because
xM < R
T2
w (b0) (< R
P
w (b0)) and R
T2
w (bML) < xL < R
P
w (bML) (< R
T2
m (xM )), the PSEI and
the Type 2 hold.
Figures 4 and 5 show how the outcomes in Example 1 depend on xH ; xM and xL while
holding all other parameters constant. There is an overlap between the two equilibria for xM
< RT2w (b0) and R
T2
w (bML) < xL < R
P
w (bML).
The intuition of multiple equilibria is as follows: marriage patterns are determined by all
agentsexpectations about the actions of agents with imperfect self-knowledge. If all agents
expect that kML-type (l = M;L) women will accept L-type men, these expectations form
GT2w (x). Then, the marriage pattern of the Type 2 arises. On the other hand, if all agents
expect that kML-type women will reject L-type men, the marriage pattern of the PSEI arises
through GPw (x).
30
5 Discussion two-sided imperfect self-knowledge
In this paper, we assume one-sided imperfect self-knowledge: no women initially know their
own types, whereas all men know their own types.31 This one-sided imperfect self-knowledge
assumption is important in order to clarify the inuence of imperfect self-knowledge. From
Lemma 2, the uncertainty of an agents own type a¤ects her own expected life utility. More-
over, the existence of others with imperfect self-knowledge also a¤ects agentsexpected life
utilities from Lemma 1. We can analyze these two inuences on the expected life utility of
an agent separately, under the assumption of the one-sided imperfect self-knowledge. The
one-sided imperfect self-knowledge assumption describes the situations given below. In the
context of the labor market, a rm has more information about its own type than a worker
because the rm will generally have more experience than the worker. In the context of the
marriage market, when more men work outside the home than women, it will be easier for
men than for women to get the objective data on their own charm, such as income, position
at work, and social status.
Although two-sided imperfect self-knowledge all men and women initially lack knowledge
of their own types is a nontrivial extension, our results suggest that, if two-sided imperfect
29RT1m (xM ) = R
P
m (xM ) always holds from Propositions 2 and 3.
30The welfare implication of these two steady states is obtained in Example 2 in Appendix C.
31 In our analysis, a man and a woman are assumed to propose or reject a member of the opposite sex
simultaneously. As we assume that all men know their own types and no women initially know their own
types, similar results can also be obtained in the case of a sequential move in which a man proposes to a
woman in the rst move and she proposes or rejects him in the next move.
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self-knowledge is assumed in the optimism case, the reservation level of any agent (he)
will be simultaneously a¤ected by the following two factors: (i) the large share of optimistic
women who now reject his type; and (ii) the uncertainty of his own type. The rst element
always lowers his reservation level from Lemma 1. For the second element, as we show in
Lemma 2, his reservation level decreases or increases relative to that in the case of perfect
self-knowledge. On the other hand, in the case of pessimism, only the uncertainty of his own
type will a¤ect his reservation level. Hence, two-sided imperfect self-knowledge will make the
analysis more complex. Such work is left for future research.
6 Concluding remarks
We analyzed a two-sided search model in which we presumed that no women initially know
their own types and then learn their own types from o¤ers or rejections by men. With this
learning process, the two-sided aspect of a search problem generated a signicant interest.
In particular, we showed that the optimism of some agents prevents the lowest-type agents
from matching in an equilibrium. However, the pessimism of some agents does not a¤ect the
matching of the lowest-type agents.
Our model can also explain that the reservation level declines with the duration of search.
Burdett and Vishwanath (1988) showed that when workers learn the unknown wage distrib-
ution, the reservation wage of an unemployed worker declines with his or her unemployment
spell. Unlike their model, ours is a two-sided search and single agents know the type dis-
tribution but do not know their own types. The results in this paper showed that a high
o¤er results in the agent getting married similarly to the nding by Burdett and Vishwanath
(1988). However, if women with imperfect self-knowledge start to search with the strategies
of accepting only the highest type of men, a woman revises her reservation level downward
whenever she receives a rejection that has some information about her own type. On the
other hand, an o¤er lower than the reservation level does not a¤ect the decision of a woman
with imperfect self-knowledge. An o¤er much lower than the reservation level is proposed
by a man whom the woman with imperfect self-knowledge rejects. Thus, her decision re-
garding whether to accept or not another type of men is not a¤ected by that o¤er. An o¤er
from a man whom she decides whether to accept or not also does not a¤ect her decision in
equilibrium because the man chooses his strategy so as not to raise her reservation level.
We conclude with a discussion of some possible further extensions of this model. First,
this paper assumes that there is no divorce. However, when a woman marries a man before
thoroughly understanding her own type, she may learn about her actual type after she gets
married. In this case, the divorce rate will be inuenced by this learning in marriage.
Next, we assume three types of agents. If we consider a model in which there are n types
of agents and many clusters of marriages, the learning process about ones own type will be
more complex. However, if there are n types of agents and three clusters of marriages are
generated by a large enough , our results also apply to this case.
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Appendix A.1
Appendix A.1.1. Beliefs and the distribution of beliefs of women in the PSEI
As actions of each type of men are the same as those in the PSE, learning processes of women
are described as in Figure 1. The outline box for each type in Figure 1 represents the share of
each type of women wk ; (k = H;M;L). For example, if an H0-type woman meets an H-type
man, then she learns that she is an H-type, leaving the market with him. After another
H0-type woman meets an M -type man, she becomes an HHM -type woman. As a result,
there are two kinds of H-type women according to di¤erent beliefs: H0-type and HHM -type.
Here, let  2 (0; 1) denote the share of HHM -type women in H-type women. Similarly, we
can consider the learning process of M -type and L-type women (see Figure 1). Here, for
the M -type women, let  2 (0; 1) ;  (1  ) 2 (0; 1), and  2 (0; 1) denote the share of
MML-type women,MHM -type women, andMM -type women inM -type women, respectively.
For the L-type women, let  (1  ) 2 (0; 1) ;   2 (0; 1) ; and  2 (0; 1) denote the share
of LML-type women, LL1-type women, and LL2-type women in L-type women, respectively.
From these shares (; ; ; ;  ; v; k) and wk , the stationary distribution G
P
w (x) is given.
Moreover, in a steady state, (MEI-iii) is required. That is, in Figure 1,
mM (1  )wH = mHwH ; (12)
mH (1    )wM = mMwM ; (13)
mM (1    )wM = mH (1  )wM = mMwM ; (14)
mH (1     )wL = mM (1  )wL = mL  vwL ; (15)
mM (1     )wL = mL wL : (16)
From (12) to (16), we obtain
 =  =
mM
mH+
m
M
; (17)
 =
(mH)
2
(mH+
m
M)
2 ;  =  =
mH
(mH+
m
M)
; (18)
 =
mM
(mL +
m
M)
;  =
(mM)
2
(mL +
m
M)(
m
H+
m
M)
: (19)
The (actual) type distribution of the new single women consists of the shares of k0-type
women (k = H;M;L). From Figure 1, the prior belief of a woman consists of bP0 (xH)
=
(1 )wH
(1 )wH+(1  )wM+(1   )wL , b
P
0 (xM ) =
(1  )wM
(1 )wH+(1  )wM+(1   )wL , and b
P
0 (xL) =
(1   )wL
(1 )wH+(1  )wM+(1   )wL . Substituting (17)(19) into these three equations, we obtain
bP0 (xH) =
mH
w
H(
m
H+
m
M)(
m
L +
m
M)
mH(
m
H
w
H+
w
H
m
M+
m
M
w
M)(
m
L +
m
M)+(
m
H+
m
M)
m
L 
w
L
m
M
;
bP0 (xM ) =
(mL +
m
M)
m
H
m
M
w
M
mH(
m
H
w
H+
w
H
m
M+
m
M
w
M)(
m
L +
m
M)+(
m
H+
m
M)
m
L 
w
L
m
M
;
25
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 10-26
bP0 (xL) =
(mH+
m
M)
m
L 
w
L
m
M
mH(
m
H
w
H+
w
H
m
M+
m
M
w
M)(
m
L +
m
M)+(
m
H+
m
M)
m
L 
w
L
m
M
:
Given the prior belief, by Bayesrule, we obtain
bPHM (xH) =
wH(
m
H+
m
M)
wH(
m
H+
m
M)+
m
M
w
M
; (20)
bPHM (xM ) =
mM
w
M
mH
w
H+
w
H
m
M+
m
M
w
M
;
bPML (xM ) =
mH
w
M(
m
L +
m
M)
mL 
w
L(
m
H+
m
M)+
m
H
w
M(
m
L +
m
M)
; (21)
bPML (xL) =
mL 
w
L(
m
H+
m
M)
mL 
w
L(
m
H+
m
M)+
m
H
w
M(
m
L +
m
M)
;
bPHM (xL) = b
P
ML (xH) = 0;
bPM (xM ) = b
P
L (xL) = 1:
It is noteworthy that from Figure 1, we can conrm that these beliefs are consistent with
GPw (x) :
32
Appendix A.1.2. Beliefs and the distribution of beliefs of women in the Type
1 As anM - or L-type man accepts any woman, the woman who receives his proposal learns
nothing about her own type. Therefore, only when a woman meets an H-type man does
she learn something about her own type. Figure 2 describes the womens learning processes.
From Figure 2, there are ve kinds of women according to di¤erent beliefs: k0-type women
(k = H;M;L) and kML-type women (k = M;L). Here,  2 (0; 1) and $ 2 (0; 1) denote
the share of MML-type women in M -type women and that of LML-type women in L-type
women, respectively.
(MEI-iii) requires that
mH (1  )wM = mMwM ; (22)
mH (1 $)wL = mM$wL ; (23)
hold in Figure 2. From these equations, we obtain
 = $ =
mH
mH+
m
M
: (24)
Therefore, the prior belief of a woman consists of bT10 (xH) =
wH
wH+(1 )(wM+wL)
, bT10 (xM )
=
(1 )wM
wH+(1 )(wM+wL)
, and bT10 (xL) =
(1 )wL
wH+(1 )(wM+wL)
. If we substitute (22) and (23) into
32As we employ the cloning assumption, one can conrm that bPHM (xH) =
wH
w
H
+(1 )w
M
, bPHM (xM ) =
(1 )wM
w
H
+(1 )w
M
, bPML (xM ) =
wM
w
M
+ (1 )w
L
, bPML (xL) =
 (1 )wL
w
M
+ (1 )w
L
; bPM (xM ) =
wM
w
M
, and bPL (xL) =
( v+)wL
( v+)w
L
hold.
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these three equations, we obtain:
bT10 (xH) =
wH(
m
H+
m
M)
mH
w
H+
m
M
; (25)
bT10 (xM ) =
wM
m
M
mH
w
H+
m
M
;
bT10 (xL) =
wL
m
M
mH
w
H+
m
M
From Figure 2, we can conrm that these beliefs are consistent with GT1w (x) :
Appendix A.1.3. Beliefs and the distribution of beliefs of women in the Type 2
The information about womens types from proposals or rejections by men is also the same
as that in the PSEI because the actions of men are the same as those in the PSEI. Then,
the learning processes of women are also the same as those in the PSEI (see Figure 3). Let
2 2 (0; 1), 2 (1  2) 2 (0; 1), 22 2 (0; 1), 2 2 (0; 1),  2 (1  2) 2 (0; 1),  22 2 (0; 1),
and 2 2 (0; 1) denote the share of HHM -type women, that of MHM -type women, that of
MM -type women, that of MML-type women, that of LML-type women, that of LL1-type
women, and that of LL2-type women, respectively.
(MEI-iii) requires that in Figure 3,
mM (1  2)wH = mH2wH ; (26)
mH (1  2   2)wM =  (mM + mL )2wM ; (27)
mM (1  2   2)wM = mH2 (1  2)wM = mM22wM ; (28)
mH (1   2   2)wL =  (mM + mL ) 2 (1  2)wL (29)
mM 2 (1  2)wL = mL  22wL ; (30)
mM (1   2   2)wL = mL 2wL : (31)
All equations, except (27) and (29), have the same forms as (12) and (14)(16) in the
PSEI. From (26) to (31), we obtain
2 =
mM
mH+
m
M
; (32)
2 =
(mH)
2
mH+(
m
M+
m
L )(
m
H+
m
M)
; (33)
2 =
(mM+
m
L )(
m
H+
m
M)
mH+(
m
M+
m
L )(
m
H+
m
M)
; 2 =
mH
(mM+
m
H)
; (34)
 2 = 
m
H ; 2 =
mM
(mM+
m
L )
; 2 = 
m
M : (35)
Then, the prior belief of a woman consists of bT20 (xH) =
(1 2)wH
(1 2)wH+(1 2 2)wM+(1  2 2)wL
, bT20 (xM ) =
(1 2 2)wM
(1 2)wH+(1 2 2)wM+(1  2 2)wL , and b
T2
0 (xL) =
(1  2 2)wL
(1 2)wH+(1 2 2)wM+(1  2 2)wL .
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If we substitute (32)(35) into these three equations, we obtain:
bT20 (xH) =
wH
m
H(
m
H+
m
H
m
L +
m
M)
(mH+
m
M+
m
H
m
L )(
m
H
w
H+(
m
H
m
L +
m
L 
m
M)
w
L)+
w
M
m
H(
m
M+
m
L )(
m
H+
m
M)
;
bT20 (xM ) =
wM
m
H(
m
M+
m
L )(
m
H+
m
M)
(mH+
m
M+
m
H
m
L )(
m
H
w
H+(
m
H
m
L +
m
L 
m
M)
w
L)+
w
M
m
H(
m
M+
m
L )(
m
H+
m
M)
;
bT20 (xL) =
wL
m
L (
m
H+
m
M)(
m
H+
m
H
m
L +
m
M)
(mH+
m
M+
m
H
m
L )(
m
H
w
H+(
m
H
m
L +
m
L 
m
M)
w
L)+
w
M
m
H(
m
M+
m
L )(
m
H+
m
M)
:
Given the prior belief, we obtain
bT2HM (xH) =
wH(
m
H+(
m
H+
m
M)(
m
L +
m
M))
mH
w
H+(
m
L +
m
M)(
m
H+
m
M)(
w
H+
w
M)
; (36)
bT2HM (xM ) =
wM(
m
L +
m
M)(
m
H+
m
M)
mH
w
H+(
m
L +
m
M)(
m
H+
m
M)(
w
H+
w
M)
;
bT2ML (xM ) =
mH
w
M(
m
L +
m
M)
wL
m
L (
m
H+
m
H
m
L +
m
M)+
m
H
w
M(
m
L +
m
M)
; (37)
bT2ML (xL) =
wL
m
L (
m
H+
m
H
m
L +
m
M)
wL
m
L (
m
H+
m
H
m
L +
m
M)+
m
H
w
M(
m
L +
m
M)
;
bT2HM (xL) = b
T2
ML (xH) = 0;
bT2M (xM ) = b
T2
L (xL) = 1:
From Figure 3, we can conrm that these beliefs are consistent with GT2w (x) :
Appendix A.2
Proof of Proposition 1: First, we consider the decision of an H-type agent. He (she)
decides whether to accept or not a woman (a man) of the M - or L-type. From (2), the
expected discounted lifetime utility of a single H-type agent Vi (xH) ; (i = m;w) becomes
rVi (xH) = 
j
H
 
xH
r   Vi (xH)

+ jM

max
 
Vi (xH) ;
xM
r
  Vi (xH)+ jL max  Vi (xH) ; xLr   Vi (xH) : (38)
An H-type agent (i = m;w) meets an H-type agent of the opposite sex j (= w;m) with
probability jH , and they marry. However, if an H-type agent meets an M - (L-) type agent
of the opposite sex with probability jM (
j
L), he or she compares xM=r (xL=r) and Vi (xH)
and then decides whether or not to propose.
If an H-type agent turns down an M -type agent of the opposite sex j, Vi (xH) >
xM
r .
From (38), this H-type agents discounted lifetime utility when he or she is single becomes
rV ri (xH) = 
j
H
 
xH
r   V ri (xH)

:
On the other hand, when he or she accepts an M -type agent j and turns down an L-type
agent j, i.e., xMr  Vi (xH) > xLr , his or her value function is33
33 If an H-type agent proposes to an M -type agent but turns down an L-type agent (xL=r < VH  xM=r),
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rV ai (xH) = 
j
H
 
xH
r   V ai (xH)

+ jM
 
xM
r   V ai (xH)

:
If V ri (xH) > V
a
i (xH) is satised, an H-type agent refuses an M -type opposite sex agent
j. This inequality V ri (xH) > V
a
i (xH) means that
xM < R

i (xH)  
j
HxH
jH+r
:
If xM  Ri (xH), an H-type agent proposes to an M -type agent i.
Under inequality (3), we can obtain the condition for anM -type agent to reject an L-type
opposite sex agent j by the same process as that described above. Consequently, we have
xL < R

i (xM )  
j
MxM
jM+r
:

Proof of Lemma 1: The reservation level of an M -type man for an L-type woman can
be calculated as follows: now, a fraction  2 (0; 1) of M -type women and a fraction  2 (0; 1)
of L-type women accept M -type men. If an M -type man turns down an L-type woman
(V rm (xM ) > xL=r), his value function becomes
rV rm (xM ) = 
w
M
 
xM
r   V rm (xM )

:
Conversely, when an M -type man proposes to an L-type woman (V am (xM )  xL=r)
rV am (xM ) = 
w
M
 
xM
r   V am (xM )

+ wL
 
xL
r   V am (xM )

:
Hence, we have his reservation utility level for declining an L-type woman, 
w
MxM
(r+wM)

RPm (xM ). Compared to the PSE, we have
RPm (xM ) Rm (xM ) =   r
w
MxM (1 )
(r+wM)(r+
w
M)
< 0:
From (17) to (19) and Figure 1,  = +  = 
m
H
mH+
m
M
and  =  +  = 
m
H
m
L +
m
H
m
M+
2m
M
(mL +
m
M)(
m
H+
m
M)
hold in inequality (6) in the PSEI. 
Proof of Lemma 2: The reservation level of a kML-type woman for an L-type man can
be calculated as follows. The expected discounted lifetime utility of a kML-type woman can
be written as
the high- and M -type agents receive at least the same number of o¤ers. Hence, VH  VM , and then we have
VM  xM=r. Namely, an M -type agent wishes to marry another M -type agent. Similarly, if an M -type agent
accepts an L-type agent (VM  xL=r), the middle- and L-type agents receive at least the same number of
o¤ers. Then, an L-type agent also wants to marry another L-type agent.
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rVw (bML) = b
P
ML (xM )

mM
 
xM
r   Vw (bML)

+ mL
 
max

xL
r ; Vw (bML)
	  Vw (bML)
+ bPML (xL)

mM (Vw (bL)  Vw (bML)) + mL
 
max

xL
r ; Vw (bML)
	  V rw (bML)
(39)
rVw (bL) = 
m
L
 
xL
r   Vw (bL)

: (40)
The rst term in the second square bracket in Equation (39) means that, if the actual type
of a kML-type woman is an L-type, she learns that she is an L-type by meeting an M -type
man. She then changes her value function to (40) because she is accepted by an L-type man.
From (39) and (40), the reservation level of a kML-type woman for an L-type man is
RPw (bML) 
mMxM(r+
m
L )(bPML(xM ))
r(r+mL +
m
M)+2
m
L 
m
M(bPML(xM ))
:
Compared to the benchmark case, we have
RPw (bML) Rw (xM ) =  
rmMxM(r+
m
L +
m
M)(1 (bPML(xM )))
(r+mM)(r(r+
m
L +
m
M)+2
m
L 
m
M(bPML(xM )))
< 0:
On the other hand, the reservation level of a kHM -type woman for anM -type man can be
calculated as follows. The expected discounted lifetime utility of a kHM -type woman becomes
rVw (bHM ) = b
P
HM (xH)

mH
 
xH
r   Vw (bHM )

+ mM
 
max

xM
r ; Vw (bHM )
	  Vw (bHM )
+bPHM (xM )

mH (Vw (bM )  Vw (bHM )) + mM
 
max

xM
r ; Vw (bHM )
	  Vw (bHM ) ;(41)
rVw (bM ) = 
m
M
 
xM
r   Vw (bM )

: (42)
The rst term in the second square bracket in (41) implies that, if the actual type of a
kHM -type woman is the M -type, she learns that she is an M -type after a meeting with an
H-type man. She then changes her value function to (42) as M -type men accept M -type
women.
Therefore, the reservation level of a kHM -type woman for an M -type man is
RPw (bHM ) 
mHxH(r+
m
M)(bPHM (xH))
r(r+mH+
m
M)+2
m
H
m
M(bPHM (xH))
:
Compared to the benchmark case, we have
RPw (bHM ) Rw (xH) =  
rmHxH(r+
m
H+
m
M)(1 (bPHM (xH)))
(r+mH)(r2+r
m
H+r
m
M+
2mH
m
M(bPHM (xH)))
< 0:
Given the strategies of all agents except k0-type women, we can obtain the lifetime utility
of a k0-type woman. The expected discounted lifetime utility of a k0-type woman becomes
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rVw (b0) = b
P
0 (xH)

mH
 
xH
r   Vw (b0)

+ mM
 
max

xM
r ; Vw (bHM )
	  Vw (b0)
+bP0 (xM )

mH (Vw (bML)  Vw (b0)) + mM
 
max

xM
r ; Vw (bHM )
	  Vw (b0)
+bP0 (xL) [
m
H (Vw (bML)  Vw (b0)) + mM (Vw (bL)  Vw (b0))] : (43)
The third term in the rst (or the second) square bracket in Equation (43) means that, if
a k0-type woman is actually the H- (or M -) type and if she rejects an M -type man, she
learns that she is the H- or the M -type after meeting an M -type man. She then changes her
optimal strategy to RPw (bHM ). On the other hand, if a k0-type woman is actually the H- (or
M -) type and if a k0-type woman accepts an M -type man, the third term in the rst (or the
second) square bracket in Equation (43) becomes xMr .
Therefore, the reservation level of a k0-type woman for an M -type man is
RPw (b0) = R
P
w (bHM ) > ()xM :
If RPw (b0) > ()xM , a k0-type woman rejects (accepts) an M -type man.
From (20) and (21), bPML (xM ) =
mH
w
M(
m
L +
m
M)
mL 
w
L(
m
H+
m
M)+
m
H
w
M(
m
L +
m
M)
and bPHM (xH) =
wH(
m
H+
m
M)
wH(
m
H+
m
M)+
m
M
w
M
hold in steady state.
Proof of Lemma 3: As an M -type man accepts an L-type woman, an MML-type
woman and an LML-type woman face the same problem. They decide whether to accept or
not L-type men. Therefore, the value function of a kML-type (k =M;L) woman is
rVw (bML) = 
m
M
 
xM
r   Vw (bML)

+ mL
 
max

xL
r ; Vw (bML)
	  Vw (bML) : (44)
Therefore, the reservation level of a kML-type woman for an L-type man is
RT1w (bML) 
mMxM
r + mM
= Rw (xM ) :
As xL < Rw (xM ), xL < RPw (bML) holds. Hence, a kML-type woman turns down an L-type
man.
Given the strategies of all agents except a k0-type woman, we can obtain the lifetime
utility of a k0-type (k = H;M;L) woman. As an M -type man accepts an L-type woman, an
M0-type woman and an L0-type woman face the same problem. Then, the value function of
a k0-type woman is
rVw (b0) = b
T1
0 (xH)

mH
 
xH
r   Vw (b0)

+ mM
 
max

xM
r ; Vw (b0)
	  Vw (b0)
+
 
1  bT10 (xH)
 
mH (V
r
w (bML)  Vw (b0)) + mM
 
max

xM
r ; Vw (b0)
	  Vw (b0) :(45)
The second term in Equation (45) means that, if the actual type of a k0-type woman is the
M - or L-type, she becomes a kML-type woman after meeting an H-type man. She then
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changes her optimal strategy to RT1w (bML) > xL.
Therefore, the reservation level of a k0-type woman for an M -type man is
RT1w (b0) 
mHxH(r+
m
M)bT10 (xH)
r(r+mH+
m
M)+2
m
H
m
M b
T1
0 (xH)
:
Compared to the benchmark case, we have
RT1w (b0) Rw (xH) =   (
rmHxH(r+
m
H+
m
M))(1 bT10 (xH))
(r+mH)(r2+r
m
H+r
m
M+
2mH
m
M b
T1
0 (xH))
< 0:
From (25), bT10 (xH) =
wH(
m
H+
m
M)
mH
w
H+
m
M
holds in the Type 1.
Proof of Lemma 4: We can consider the following three cases for the pessimistic
behavior of a woman with imperfect self-knowledge: (I) an MML-type woman accepts an
L-type man; (II) an H0- or HHM -type woman rejects an L-type man; and (III) a k0- or
kHM -type (k = H;M) woman accepts an L-type man.
First, we consider the case of (I). Let us assume that kML-type (k =M;L) women accept
L-type men. Furthermore, because there are enough pessimistic MML-type women for an
L-type man, L-type men reject L-type women. From Rm (xH) > xM , H-type men reject
M -type women. In addition, to clear the inuence of pessimism, we assume that M -type
men reject L-type women.
Given the strategies of all men, the expected discounted lifetime utility of a kML-type
woman can be written as
rVw (bML) = bML (xM )

mM
 
xM
r   Vw (bML)

+ mL
 
max

xL
r ; Vw (bM )
	  Vw (bML)
+ bML (xL) [ (
m
M + 
m
L ) (0  Vw (bML))] :
As Rw (bM ) = Rw (xM ) > xL;
xL
r < Vw (bM ). That is, a kML-type woman rejects an L-type
man when he rejects an L-type woman. This contradicts the assumption that an MML-type
woman accepts an L-type man. Therefore, even if there are enough MML-type women who
accept L-type men, an L-type man always accepts an L-type woman.
Next, we consider the case of (II). Let us assume that M -type men reject M -type
women because there are enough pessimistic H0-type women who accept M -type men. From
Rm (xH) > xM , H-type men reject M -type women. At this time, from (5), the expected
discounted lifetime utility of a k0-type woman can be written as
rVw (b0) = b0 (xH)
"
mH
 
xH
r   Vw (b0)

+ mM
 
max

xM
r ; Vw (bH)
	  Vw (b0)
+mL
 
Vw
 
blj(xL;atm(xH))
  Vw (b0)
#
+ b0 (xM )

 (mH + 
m
M ) (Vw (bML)  Vw (b0)) + mL
 
Vw
 
blj(xL;atm(xM ))
  Vw (b0)
+ b0 (xL)

 (mH + 
m
M ) (Vw (bHL)  Vw (b0)) + mL
 
Vw
 
blj(xL;atm(xL))
  Vw (b0) ;
where Vw
 
blj(xL;atm(xk))

depends on the strategy of an L-type man.34 However, from the
34 If an L-type man rejects an L-type woman, then
32
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 10-26
above equation, learning by the action of an L-type man does not a¤ect her decision regarding
whether to accept or not an M -type man. Therefore, the problem, whether a k0-type woman
accepts an M -type man or not, reduces to the comparison between xMr and Vw (bH).
35 As
xM < R

i (xH),
xM
r < Vw (bH) = V (xH), i.e., a k0-type woman rejects an M -type man. This
contradicts the assumption that a k0-type woman accepts an M -type man.
Similarly, let us assume thatM -type men rejectM -type women because there are enough
pessimistic HHM -type women for an M -type man. In this case, L-type men reject L-type
women and accept M -type women. Otherwise, there are no kHM -women in the market. The
expected discounted lifetime utility of an HHM -type woman becomes
rVw (bHM ) = bHM (xH)

mH
 
xH
r   Vw (bHM )

+ mM
 
max

xM
r ; Vw (bH)
	  Vw (bHM )
+ bHM (xM ) [ (
m
H + 
m
M ) (Vw (bM )  Vw (bHM ))] :
Therefore, the decision of a kHM -type woman is the same as that of a k0-type woman. Hence,
a kHM -type woman rejects an M -type man. However, this contradicts the assumption that
a kHM -type woman accepts an M -type man. Therefore, when there are pessimistic H0- or
HHM -type women who accept M -type men, M -type men always accept M -type women.
Finally, we consider the case of (III). Let us assume that k0-type women accept L-type
men. Furthermore, L-type men reject L-type women because there are enough pessimistic
k0-type (k = H;M) women for an L-type man. From Rm (xH) > xM , H-type men reject
M -type women. From the results in the case of (II), M -type men always accept M -type
women even if there are enough pessimistic H0-type women.36 Because L-type men reject
L-type women, M -type men also reject L-type women.
At this time, the expected discounted lifetime utility of a k0-type woman can be written
as
rVw (b0) = b0 (xH)
"
mH
 
xH
r   Vw (b0)

+ mM
 
xM
r   Vw (b0)

+mL
 
max

xL
r ; Vw (bHM )
	  Vw (b0)
#
+ b0 (xM )
"
mH (Vw (bML)  Vw (b0)) + mM
 
xM
r   Vw (b0)

+mL
 
max

xL
r ; Vw (bHM )
	  Vw (b0)
#
+ b0 (xL) [
m
H (Vw (bML)  Vw (b0)) +  (mM + mL ) (0  Vw (b0))] :
Therefore, the problem, whether a k0-type woman accepts an L-type man or not, reduces
to the comparison between xLr and Vw (bHM ). The expected discounted lifetime utility of a
Vw

blj(xL;atm(xk))

=

Vw (bHM ) if
 
xL; a
t
m (xk)

= (xL; a)
0 if
 
xL; a
t
m (xk)

=
 
xL; a
  :
If an L-type man accepts an L-type woman, then Vw

blj(xL;atm(xk))

= Vw (b0).
35 In the above equation, the number of terms in the case where a k0-type woman accepts an M -type man
equals that of terms in the case where a k0-type woman rejects an M -type man because V (bH) 6= V (b0) :
36M -type men know their own types. Hence, their decisions are the same as those in the case of (II).
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kHM -type woman can be written as
rVw (bHM ) = bHM (xH)
"
mH
 
xH
r   Vw (bHM )

+ mM
 
xM
r   Vw (bHM )

+mL
 
max

xL
r ; Vw (bHM )
	  Vw (bHM )
#
+ bHM (xM )
"
mH (Vw (bM )  Vw (bHM )) + mM
 
xM
r   Vw (bHM )

+mL
 
max

xL
r ; Vw (bHM )
	  Vw (bHM )
#
:
Hence, we have
mMxM(r+
m
Hb(xM )+
m
M)+
m
HxH(r+
m
M)b(xH)
(r+mM)(r+
m
H+
m
M)
= Rw (bHM ) :
From Rw (xM )  xH
Rw (bHM ) Rw (xM ) = mH
b(xH)(rxH+mM (xH xM ))
(r+mM)(r+
m
H+
m
M)
> 0:
As Rw (xM ) > xL, Rw (bHM ) > xL. Therefore, a kHM - and k0-type woman always rejects
an L-type man. This contradicts the assumption that a k0- or kHM -type woman accepts
an L-type man when an L-type man rejects an L-type woman. Therefore, when there are
pessimistic k0- or kHM -type women who accept L-type men, L-type men always accept L-type
women.
Proof of Lemma 5: From Lemma 4, M - (L-)type men always accept M - (L-)type
women, even if there are many H- (H- or M -)type women with imperfect self-knowledge,
who accept M - (L-)type men. Moreover, H-type men always reject M -type women from
Ri (xH) > xM . Therefore, we only have to consider the following cases: (i) M -type men
accept L-type women, and (ii) M -type men accept M -type women, and L-type men accept
L-type women.
When a k0-type woman rejects an M -type man, the case of (i) is the same as Lemma
3. At this time, learning occurs only when H-type men reject M - or L-type women. As a
kML-type woman accepts an M -type man, RT1w (b0) > xM  RT1w (bML) = Rw (xM ). Hence,
the rejection from an H-type man decreases the reservation level of a woman with imperfect
self-knowledge.
Next, we investigate the case of (ii). At this time, RPw (bML) < R

w (xM ) = Rw (bM ) <
RPw (bHM ) = R
P
w (b0) holds because this case is the same as the case in Lemma 2. Therefore,
a rejection from a man decreases the reservation utility level of the woman with imperfect
self-knowledge.
Proof of Lemma 6: As RT2m (xM ) > xL, the information about types of women from
the proposals by men and the learning processes of women are the same as those in the PSEI.
Hence, the reservation levels of women are obtained in the same manner as those in the PSEI:
RT2w (bML) 
mMxM(r+
m
L )bT2ML(xM )
r(r+mL +
m
M)+2
m
L 
m
M b
T2
ML(xM )
< Rw (xM ) = R
T2
w (bM ) ;
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RT2w (bHM ) = R
T2
w (b0) 
mHxH(r+
m
M)bT2HM (xH)
r(r+mH+
m
M)+2
m
H
m
M b
T2
HM (xH)
(< Rw (xH)) :
From (36) and (37), bT2ML (xM ) =
mH
w
M(
m
L +
m
M)
wL
m
L (
m
H+
m
H
m
L +
m
M)+
m
H
w
M(
m
L +
m
M)
and bT2HM (xH) =
wH(
m
H+(
m
H+
m
M)(
m
L +
m
M))
mH
w
H+(
m
L +
m
M)(
m
H+
m
M)(
w
H+
w
M)
hold in the Type 2.
Appendix B
Two types In this paper, we assume not two but three types of agents in order to show
the inuence of the indirect externality of optimism on the market. If we consider two types
of agents in the case of optimism, the indirect externality does not occur, and we cannot nd
a case in which the indirect externality of optimism prevents the lowest type of agents from
marrying. To see this, now, let us assume two types of agents: good and bad. Let us assume
that, when all agents have perfect self-knowledge, the PSE occurs. To describe the optimism,
let us assume that i0-type women (i = g; b) reject bad-type men. Therefore, there are two
kinds of bad-type women with respect to di¤erences in their beliefs: bad-type women who are
optimistic and bad-type women who know their own types. However, good-type men do not
change their reservation utility levels relative to the case of perfect self-knowledge because
all women want to marry them. Then, the indirect externality of optimism does not occur.
Hence, bad-type men always marry bad-type women with perfect self-knowledge.
On the other hand, in the case of pessimism with two types of agents, we obtain, qual-
itatively, the same results as those of Lemma 4 and Proposition 4. That is, the indirect
externality of pessimism does not occur, and, as a result, all agents can then marry.
The assumption of optimism We adopt the assumption that a k0-type woman rejects
an M -type man in the optimism case because we focus on the case in which M -type women
are optimistic in order to show that the indirect externality of optimism a¤ects the marriage
behaviors of lower-type agents.
If k0-type women accept M -type men (or reject L-type men), all agents can marry. To
see this, let us assume that k0-type women acceptM -type men. At this time, L0-type women
are optimistic, and H0-type women are pessimistic. The pessimism of H0-type women does
not change the actions of M -type men for the same reason as in Lemma 4. Moreover, the
indirect externality of optimism by L-type women does not arise, similarly to that in two
types of agents.
Let us consider another optimism case in which because there are enough MHM -type
women who reject M -type men, M -type men accept L-type women. However, this case does
not arise. This is because the existence of MHM -type women requires that an M - or L-type
man rejects an L-type woman (now, H-type men reject M -type women as xM < Rm (xH)).
Benchmark case In our analysis, we consider the case in which xM < Ri (xH) and
xL < R

i (xM ) (i = m;w) hold as the benchmark case. If we consider the case in which
35
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xM  Ri (xH) and xL < Ri (xM ) hold as the benchmark case, the result is the same as the
case of the two types. Thus, the indirect externality of optimism does not occur. To see
this, let us dene the next situation as a benchmark case: if all agents know their own types
perfectly, xM  Ri (xH) and xL < Ri (xM ) hold. Let us assume that, under xM  Ri (xH)
and xL < Ri (xM ), k0-type women reject M -type men, and then M -type men accept L-
type women due to the rejections from M0-type women. That is, the indirect externality of
optimism occurs. However, the reservation level of a k0-type woman is always lower than
Ri (xH) because she assigns probabilities to her own types, similarly to the case of Lemma
2. This contradicts the assumption that, under xM  Ri (xH) and xL < Ri (xM ), k0-type
women reject M -type men. Therefore, when xM  Ri (xH) and xL < Ri (xM ), k0-type
women always accept M -type men.37
Under xM < Ri (xH) and xL  Ri (xM ), the indirect externality of optimism does not
occur. When xM < Ri (xH) and xL  Ri (xM ), there are few enough M -type agents.
Therefore, even if there are some M -type women who reject M -type men due to imperfect
self-knowledge, M -type men do not change their actions: they accept L-type women. Now,
because there are few enough M -type men (xL  Ri (xM )), some L-type women (at least,
the L-type women who were rejected by H-type men) always accept L-type men. Therefore,
in this case, the indirect externality of optimism does not occur.38
Appendix Cwelfare and the number of marriages
In this section, we investigate whether the existence of women with imperfect self-knowledge
improves the welfare of the economy relative to the benchmark case. To do so, let us examine
the overall number of marriages and the overall welfare from new marriages that take place
in the marriage market at any point in time.
First, we investigate the number of marriages at the PSE as a benchmark. In the PSE,
an H-type man meets an H-type woman with probability wH , and there are 
m
HN number
of H-type men in the market. Then, the number of marriages among H-type agents is
wH
m
HN . In the same way, we obtain the number of marriages of M -type 
m
M
w
MN and
L-type wL
m
LN . Therefore, the overall number of marriages in the marriage market T
 is
T  = mH
w
HN + 
m
M
w
MN + 
m
L 
w
LN: (46)
37The assumption of xM  Ri (xH) ; i = m;w means that there are a few H-type men and women in the
market. If xM  Ri (xH) and xL < Ri (xM ) ; any H-type woman accepts an M -type man. In this case, even
if H-type women with imperfect self-knowledge accept M -type men, the behavior of these women is the same
as that of the H-type with perfect self-knowledge. Then, an M -type man does not change his behavior: he
accepts an M -type woman. If some M -type women with imperfect self-knowledge accept L-type men under
xM  Ri (xH) and xL < Ri (xM ), the indirect externality of pessimism does not occur in a steady state for
the same reason as in Lemma 4 qualitatively.
38When xM < Ri (xH) and xL  Ri (xM ) ; the following cases of pessimism can be considered. If H-type
women with imperfect knowledge accept M -type men under xM < Ri (xH) and xL  Ri (xM ), the indirect
externality of pessimism does not occur for the same reason as Lemma 4. If M -type women with imperfect
knowledge accept L-type men under xM < Ri (xH) and xL  Ri (xM ), L-type men do not change their
behavior: they accept L-type women. Then, in this case, there is no inuence of the pessimism of M -type
women.
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The number of marriages in the PSEI (T p), the Type 1
 
T T1

, and the Type 2
 
T T2

can
be derived similarly (see also Figure 13). Therefore, we obtain
T p = mH
w
HN + 

mH
mH+
m
M

wM
m
MN + 

mM
mL +
m
M

wL
m
LN; (47)
T T1 = mH
w
HN + 

mH
mH+
m
M

mM
w
MN + 

mH
mH+
m
M

mM
w
LN; (48)
and
T T2 = mH
w
HN + 

mH
mH+(
m
H+
m
M)(
m
L +
m
M)

mM
w
MN
+

(mH)
2
mH+(
m
M+
m
L )(
m
H+
m
M)

wM
m
LN +  (
m
H + 
m
M )
m
L 
w
LN: (49)
Next, we explore overall welfare. If an H-type man marries an H-type woman, each of
them obtains the utility of marriage xH . Hence, the aggregation of H-type agentsutilities
from marriage is 2mH
w
HxHN in the PSE. Similarly, we obtain 2
m
M
w
MxMN for the M -
type and 2mL 
w
LxLN for the L-type. As a result, the welfare in the PSE (W
) is
W  = mH
w
H (2xH)N + 
m
M
w
M (2xM )N + 
m
L 
w
L (2xL)N: (50)
The welfare in the PSEI (W p), the Type 1
 
W T1

, and the Type 2
 
W T2

can be derived
similarly. Hence
W p = mH
w
H (2xH)N + 

mH
mH+
m
M

wM
m
M (2xM )N + 

mM
mL +
m
M

wL
m
L (2xL)N;(51)
W T1 = mH
w
H (2xH)N
+

mH
mH+
m
M

mM
w
M (2xM )N + 

mH
mH+
m
M

mM
w
L (xM + xL)N; (52)
and
W T2 = mH
w
H (2xH)N + 

mH
mH+(
m
H+
m
M)(
m
L +
m
M)

mM
w
M (2xM )N
+

(mH)
2
mH+(
m
M+
m
L )(
m
H+
m
M)

wM
m
L (xM + xL)N +  (
m
H + 
m
M )
m
L 
w
L (2xL)N;(53)
hold. From these equations, the next lemma is immediately obtained.
Proposition 5 The number of marriages and the welfare in the PSE are higher than those
in the PSEI, i.e., T  > T p and W  > W p, respectively.
Proof. From (46) and (47),
T    T p = N ((1  (+ ))mMwM + (1  (+ v ))mL wL) > 0
holds. From (50) and (51), we also have
W p  W  =  mL wLxL (1  (+ v ))  mMwMxM (1  (+ )) < 0:
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From Proposition 5, the welfare and the number of marriages in the PSEI are lower than
those in the PSE under any Fi (x), i = m;w. This is because the marriages of all agents,
except those of H-type men and some H-type women who meet H-type men in their rst
encounter, are delayed due to the refusals by the women who are learning their own types.39
As a result, their marriages decrease, and the overall welfare then decreases. From Proposition
5, in the PSEI, the policy that promotes womens learning can improve the overall welfare.
On the other hand, the comparisons of the overall welfare and the overall number of
marriages between the PSE and Type 1 are ambiguous.
The comparisons of the overall welfare and the overall number of marriages between the
PSE and the Type 2 are also ambiguous.
It is noteworthy that, in both the Type 1 and the Type 2, the number of marriages and
the welfare of H-type men or women are not inuenced by the imperfect self-knowledge of
women.
Finally, we compare the number of marriages and the welfare in the PSEI with those in
the Type 2. As we show in Example 1, the PSEI and the Type 2 hold in some parameter
ranges.
Example 2 Let us assume that ik =
1
3 ; (i = m;w; k = H;M;L). At this time, the number
of marriages in the PSE, the PSEI, and the Type 2 are T  = 13N, T
p = 29N, and T
T2
= 47189N, respectively, from (46), (47), and (49). Then, T
 > T T2 > T p. The welfare of
marriages in the PSE, the PSEI, and the Type 2 is W  = 29N(xH + xL + xM ), W
p =
1
9N(2xH + xL + xM ), and W
T2 = 1189N(42xH + 31xL + 21xM ), respectively, from (50),
(51), and (53). Hence, W  > W T2 > W p.
When 3 > 2r and Fm (x) and Fw (x) are discrete uniform distributions, multiple equilib-
ria arise. At this time, the PSEI and the Type 2 are not Pareto-rankable; pessimistic women
prefer the PSEI, and L-type men prefer the Type 2. However, because pessimistic women
accept M - and L-type men in the Type 2, the overall number of marriages in the Type 2
increases relative to that in the PSEI. As a result, the overall welfare in the Type 2 also
increases relative to that in the PSEI. However, because ik =
1
3 , the welfare and the number
of marriages in the PSE are larger than those in the Type 2. Then, in the Type 2, the policy
that informs pessimistic women of their own types can improve the overall welfare when ik
= 13 (i = m;w; k = H;M;L).
39The duration until marriage of each agent can be obtained easily. In the PSE, the duration until marriage
of k-type man (woman) is 1
i
k
(i = m;w; k = H;M;L). However, in the PSEI, the duration until marriage
of an M -type man is 1
w
M
mH+
m
M
m
H
, that of an L-type man is 1
w
L
mL +
m
M
m
M
, that of an HHM -type woman is
1
m
H
m
M
, that of an MML-type woman is 1m
H
m
M
, that of an MM -type woman is 1m
H
m
M
m
L
, that of an
LL1-type woman is 1m
H
m
M
m
L
, and that of an LL2-type woman is 1m
M
m
L
. Therefore, their marriages are
delayed by the learning process of women.
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